In collaborative software development, developers submit their contributions, such as code commits or pull requests, to a repository. Often, this code contribution is reviewed in order to avoid privacy and security problems. Manual code review is a common way to detect such problems, but it is expensive, error-prone, and time consuming. Other automatic approaches are either designed for specific domains, such as Android platform, or demand significant effort from developers. To minimize these problems, we propose a new policy language to allow developers to specify constraints for code contributions and to enforce them between existing code and new code contributions. Our language implementation automatically checks adherence of new code contributions to these constraints for systems of different domains without demanding further effort from developers. Moreover, we plan to evaluate it regarding effectiveness and reduction of effort in finding privacy and security violations.
Motivation
Given the increasing importance of security, privacy, and related properties, classical approaches such as cryptography and certificates are necessary but insufficient because they never analyze source code [12] . Thus, to guarantee these properties, they should be checked in different levels, including program code. Moreover, it is important to guarantee these properties when developers change the program code.
In collaborative software development, developers submit their contributions, such as code commits or pull requests, to a repository. These contributions might carelessly or maliciously introduce privacy and security violations to existing projects [10] . It may become worse when unknown or untrusting developers are involved. Many issues can remain unnoticed for years, even in open source projects [7] . These violations can be detected by performing manual code reviews, but it is also desirable to use approaches for automatic analysis in order to reduce effort and errors. Tools that use Information Flow Control (IFC) analysis have been developed [14] , however they are designed to specific domains or demand significant effort from developers.
Problem
In this section, we explain and discuss an example of a real problem in Gitblit 1 system. A developer of this system was assigned a development task. His job was to improve the way Gitblit deals with Java Servlets. Among other code snippets in the resulting contribution [1] , the developer added the green line (line 5) in Listing 1 to set a user cookie. In particular, setCookie receives user, which is an instance of UserModel, and the developer did not notice that this class specifies private user information, such as password, email, and location.
Listing 1: Setting an user cookie
void l o g i n U s e r ( UserModel user ) { 3 if ( u s e r ! = null ) { 4 . . . 5 app().auth().setCookie(request, response, user);
In this way, private user information unnecessarily flows in an indirect way to setCookie, which is called within the new code contribution (line 5). This is a violation to the principle of least privilege [11] , which states that every program and every user should operate using the least amount of privilege necessary to complete the job. Thus, this new code contribution should not have access to private user information contained in user object. To worsen this scenario, in case 1 Open-source, pure Java stack for managing, viewing, and serving Git repositories. http://gitblit.com Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. developers carelessly or maliciously implement the cookie mechanism, private user information might be exposed to any attacker possessing access to user browser data. Indeed, Gitblit developers used a weak algorithm (SHA-1) to deal with this private information in cookie implementation.
A common way to detect these kinds of problems is to manually review the code contribution before merging it with existing code. Albeit necessary in many cases, manual code review is expensive, error-prone, and time consuming [6] . Manually identifying potential illegal information flows that are implicit or indirect might be a hard task. Even an experienced developer might bypass such issues [6] . For instance, while reviewing several new lines of code, a code reviewer might not notice that user is an instance of UserModel, which contains user private information.
An alternative approach is to use Information Flow Control static analysis tools. They can be designed to work only on certain domains [3] , such as Android. These tools implicitly specifies privacy and security constraints that are relevant only for its target domain. Thus, it might not be possible to guarantee that private information does not flow to a new code contribution, as in Listing 1, which is a Java Web project. This occurs because there is a lack of generality in these implicit constraints. They would need to be flexible to encompass different development tasks, systems, or domains. On the other hand, other IFC tools demand developers to manually specify the information to be protected [8, 13] . However, the use of such tools might be time-consuming and error-prone. For instance, when running JOANA on the Gitblit system for the code contribution of Listing 1, we had to analyze 408 bytecode instructions to label one of them in order to run its IFC analysis. These instructions were extracted from a method with 300 lines of code (each one can contain more than one). Labelling this instruction was time-consuming even using a graphical user interface provided by JOANA.
Last but not least, since there is no approach to automatically detect private information leakage in case a new code contribution is merged with existing code, it might take a long time to detect and fix problems such as the one presented in Listing 1 [7] . Indeed, this code contribution was merged on 3 July 2014 and it is still unfixed [1] .
Approach
To solve the lack of generality problem, we must be able to specify constraints between existing code and new code contributions. Thus, we define a new policy language, Salvum, to express constraints in order to preserve confidentiality and integrity of private information that flows within a software system. To solve the time-consuming and error-prone problem of manually specifying the information to be protected, we implement Salvum in four logical steps to enforce constraints between existing code and new code contributions.
Language Specification. The current version of our language, Salvum, supports two main constructs, noflow and noset to specify the information that cannot flow or be changed by a code contribution.
To avoid leaking private user information in the scenario of Listing 1, an experienced developer or software architect should have written the constraint of Listing 2 in our policy language. The person assigned to write constraints should identify the private information that must be confidential and the commit hashes that correspond to new code contribution. Some constraints are defined specifically for a certain task, although others can be general to be used for many tasks.
Listing 2: Protecting user properties confidentiality
UserModel{ p a s s w o r d , e m a i l , l o c a t i o n } noflow S e r v l e t s T a s k where S e r v l e t s T a s k = { e f d b 2 b 3 d 0 }
The constraint in Listing 2 specifies that the information initially stored in password, email, and location, which are fields of UserModel, cannot flow to the code contribution associated to the task ServletsTask, which includes only the commit with hash efdb2b3d0. In this case, ServletsTask corresponds to only one commit hash [1] , however other tasks could correspond to a set of commit hashes.
Additionally, developers should reason whether an information can be altered by a new code contribution. Thus, to hold private information integrity, we introduce the noset construct in Listing 3. This constraint specifies that the resulting code contribution of ServletsTask, which is identified by commit hash efdb2b3d0, cannot change password, email, or location information. By writing these constraints using our policy language, developers can specify illegal information flow to systems of different domains, which helps to circumvent the lack of generality problem. As future work, we intend to support more constructs, such as flow and set, which are useful to specify exactly the only information that can flow or be changed by a code contribution. Besides that, we intend to infer common constraints that can be applied to several tasks. An approach that fully automate classification and categorization of private information and snippets of code where it might leak, such as the one used in the SuSi tool [2] is a good starting point. At last, we plan to automate the process of identifying commit hashes by automatically looking at commit messages that contain text related to a certain task (e.g. we can use PivotalTracker 2 ). Language implementation. The Salvum language implementation includes four logical steps.
First step. The Git diff command generates a diff file, which contains the differences between existing code and the new code contribution. We define an algorithm that analyzes the diff file to obtain the classes and their source code line numbers where changes occur. Thus, the output of this step is a mapping of classes and line numbers. For example, a mapping for the snippet of code of Listing 1, which is part of ServletsTask, is RootPage:5. This mapping is useful for automatically labelling source code in order to execute an IFC analysis and detect illegal flows.
Second step. We use JOANA [13] to build a data structure called System Dependence Graph (SDG) [5] , which contains nodes that represent statements or expressions and edges that represent data dependencies or control dependencies. Thus, based on the constraints written in Salvum and the mapping explained above, our implementation automatically label nodes that represent private information, such as UserModel password, as High. On the other hand, nodes extracted from source code lines identified in the mapping as part of code contribution are automatically labelled as Low. This minimizes the time-consuming and error-prone problem. We changed JOANA source code so that SDG nodes store line numbers information of the corresponding statement or expression. To deal with information integrity, the labelling strategy is the opposite of confidentiality, since they are dual [4] . Thus, code contribution is labelled as High and private information is labelled as Low.
Moreover, JOANA might be slow to build SDGs even for projects around 50KLOC. To minimize this drawback, we plan to build the SDG once for a certain project and as more contributions are submitted, we change only the relevant parts instead of building the whole SDG again. Another challenge is to deal with parts of code contributions that do not change all statements or expressions of a given line. For example, if a code contribution adds only a new parameter to an existing method, we must label only the statement corresponding to this new parameter instead of all the statements of its original line.
Third step. After executing our labelling strategy, we run JOANA's IFC analysis to verify source code's adherence to the specification of Salvum constraints. It checks whether there are potential paths from a node labelled as High to another one labelled as Low.
Fourth step. We process the IFC analysis results to inform that private information confidentiality or integrity is being violated by code contributions. Thus, we provide a report specifying the illegal flow paths, that is, the start and end statement or expression.
Evaluation Methodology
Our goal is to evaluate our approach with respect to its efficiency in detecting violations to private information confidentiality and integrity in the context of code contributions. Thus, we address the following research questions: Q1. Can our approach detect a high rate of illegal information flow between existing code and new code contributions? Q2. Can our approach reduce the effort of developers to review new code contributions (finding violations) comparing to manual code review or using tools (e.g. JOANA and Jif)? Q3. Can our approach reduce errors regarding manually labelling information to be protected and code contributions? Q4. Does our approach scale to large projects?
Planning. We plan to select projects with commit and/or pull requests history of different domains and sizes [9] . To answer Q1, we intend to execute an empirical study. We write general constraints in Salvum (e.g. passwords cannot flow to code contributions) and run our approach to find violations on new code contributions. Thereafter, we fix found violations and patch the solution, which allow us to check the rate of acceptance. We can also ask developers about these violations. In Q2, we plan to perform a controlled experiment with graduate and undergraduate students to measure the time they need to find existing violations by manually reviewing code, by using tools such as JOANA or Jif, and by using our approach. We can also obtain the answer to Q3 in the same controlled experiment. In Q4, we plan to investigate whether our approach helps finding violations at a reasonable time for large projects (>100KLOC).
